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The Gender Gap: Separating the Sexes
in Public Education
SHARON K. MOLLAAN*
INTRODUCTION
Inner-city schools have become notorious for their failure to educate.
Children in these blighted areas, usually African-Americans or other
minorities,1 have little hope for a bright future. 2 School, which is commonly
thought to provide a stepping-stone to a better life, merely reinforces that
lack of hope. 3 The curriculum reflects the values of dominant society-
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1986,
Ohio University.
1. Detroit's public school system, for example, is 90% African-American. Isabel Wilker-
son, Detroit's Boys-Only School Facing Bias Lawsuit, N.Y. Tn&s, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al.
2. Many inner-city children face a grim future of unemployment, incarceration, or untimely
death. In Detroit, for example, murder tops the list of the causes of death for African-
American boys over the tender age of 10. Id. Nationally, murder is the leading cause of death
for Afnican-American males between the ages of 15-24. Barbara Kantrowitz et al., Can the
Boys Be Saved?, N-wswEEK, Oct. 15, 1990, at 67. An Afnican-American teenage male is 11
times more likely than a white teenage male to die of a gunshot wound, A Special Need, a
Precious Value, CH. Tam., Aug. 10, 1991, § 1, at 16 [hereinafter Special Need], and five
times as likely to be murdered. Nightline: Detroit Black "Male Academies" Ruled Unfair
(ABC television broadcast, Aug. 15, 1991, transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
ABCnew File [hereinafter Nightline] (report by Tom Foreman).
For those who survive, more will go to prison than to college. Id. Even though African-
American males make up only 6% of the U.S. population, they constitute 46% of prison
inmates. Almost one out of every four African-American men in their twenties is incarcerated
or on parole. Kantrowitz, supra at 67. Joblessness-and hopelessness-awaits the few who
escape both murder and incarceration. See Special Need, supra at 16 ("Unemployment among
young black men, even in good times, is routinely twice what it is among young whites.").
Urban African-American girls, who are less likely than their brothers to be murdered or
imprisoned, can look forward to a different future: teen pregnancy and single parenting. Most
African-Amencan children live in families headed by single mothers. See Amy Harmon, 300
Rally in Support of All-Male Schools, L.A. T , Aug. 22, 1991, at A4 (noting that 70% of
Detroit schoolchildren are raised by single mothers); Kantrowitz, supra at 67 (reporting that
in 1988, only 38.6% of African-American children nationally lived with both parents). There
seems to be a self-perpetuating cycle of teenage pregnancy and single parenthood from
generation to generation. "[T]he problems facing black females (teenage pregnancies, in
particular) can be just as staggering" as the problems facing boys. Keith L. Thomas, Raising
Black Boys in America Part 2; Volunteers Try to Reverse the Cycle of Self-Destruction;
Community Crusaders Take Mission Personally, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 3, 1991, at C4 (but
noting that the problems facing boys are more critical).
3. Rather than encouraging upward mobility, public schooling tends to perpetuate the
status quo. See Lois Weis, Issues of Disproportionality and Social Justice in Tomorrow's
Schools, in 3 SPECIAL STumns IN TF.ACNo AND T-ACHER EDUCATION: CURRICULUM FOR
ToMoRRow's ScHooLs 32, 33 (SUNY Buffalo, 1990) ("Although .. schooling enables some
individuals to experience social mobility, it also play[s] an important role in encour-
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upper-class Anglo-Amencans-and implicitly rejects both the heritage and
the daily experience of African-Americans and other minorities as unworthy
of interest. 4 Many children perceive and accept that rejection as a rejection
of themselves, destroying their sense of self-worth. Others maintain some
self-esteem by spurning the messenger along with the message. The result
is a school system which has failed our children. 5
Several urban school districts have addressed the problem by establislung,
or attempting to establish, all-male programs aimed at meeting the needs
of African-American boys.6 Educators hoped to improve the students'
aging large scale structural inequalities along the lines of social class, race, and gender.")
(footnote omitted).
[S]tudents learn attitudes and behavior suited to that level of [society] which they
will ultimately occupy. Thus, lower class blacks are concentrated in schools
"whose repressive, arbitrary, generally chaotic internal order, coercive authority
structure, and minimal possibilities for advancement mirror the characteristics of
inferior job situations." Working class students attend schools that emphasize
rule following, and close attention to the specification of others. In contrast,
schools in affluent neighborhoods have "relatively open systems that favor greater
student participation, less direct supervision, more student electives, and in
general, a value system stressing internalized standards of control."
Id. at 38 (footnotes omitted). Through their very structure, inner-city, lower-class schools teach
their students to become inner-city, lower-class citizens, without the hope or the skills to
improve their lot.
4. A community task force in Milwaukee found that "many black students suffer because
they lose their identity or become discouraged by a traditional curriculum that stresses a white,
European heritage." Carol Innerst, School Geared to Black Boys Attracts Girls, WASH. TniEs
Sept. 3, 1991, at A3.
5. The statistics are revealing. In Detroit, for example, an urban school district where
90% of the students are African-American, 54% of boys and 45% of girls drop out of school
before graduating. Elaine Ray, All-Male Black Schools Put on Hold in Detroit: Girls Will Be
Admitted After Court Challenge, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 1, 1991, at A16. Some drop out as
early as third grade. Laurel S. Walters, The Plight of Black Male Schools, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8. Nationally, one in five Afican-American males will not complete
high school. Nightline, supra note 2.
Although disturbing, the dropout rates do not tell the whole story. In Milwaukee, only 2%
of Afrcan-Amencan high school boys have a "B" average or higher; the average grade is a
"D." More than 11% of these boys have been held back. Kantrowitz, supra note 2, at 67.
"[W]hile black males constitute 27.6 per cent of public school students, they make up 50 per
cent of student suspensions and 94.4 per cent of expulsions." Bruce Fein & William B.
Reynolds, Don't Base Education on Race and Gender, N.J. L.J., Nov. 22, 1990, at 9. "They
are at the top of all the negative categories and at the bottom of the positive." Kantrowitz,
supra note 2, at 67
6. Innerst, supra note 4, at A3; Special Need, supra note 2, at 16. Brooklyn, Baltimore,
and Miami established all-male elementary school classes, although the Miami program was
later made co-ed. Ray, supra note 5, at A16 (noting that Miami converted to the safer route
of co-ed classes designed to improve self-esteem); Walters, supra note 5, at 8 (reporting that
a Baltimore all-male elementary school program opened); John Hildebrand, Bush Backs Inner-
City Male Schools, NEWSDAY, Sept. 10, 1991, at 17 (noting that Brooklyn established all-male
third-grade class, and considered all-male high school). Detroit tried to open an all-male high
school, but was ordered by a federal district court to admit girls. Garrett v. Board of Educ.,
775 F Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991). Milwaukee compromised by creating a program designed
primarily to help African-American males, but open to both sexes and all races. Kantrowitz,
supra note 2, at 67.
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education by improving their sense of self-worth through an Afro-centric
curriculum, male role models, special tutoring, and discipline. 7 Anecdotal
information indicated that the programs were working: attendance rates and
test scores went up, and behavioral problems went down.'
Despite their initial success, a number of the all-male programs were
cancelled because of gender discrimination claims. 9 To some advocates of
the all-boys schools, these claims of gender discrimination seemed to be
raised only to block efforts to help eradicate the subjugation of African-
American males.' 0 But the claim of gender discrimination should not be so
easily dismissed. Creating exclusively male schools implies that part of the
problem with the current system is the presence of girls." This is a dangerous
7. See Fein & Reynolds, supra note 5, at 9 (noting that Afro-centric curriculum is intended
to improve acadenc performance by evoking the pride of black males in their race and its
achievements); Helaine Greenfeld, Note, Some Constitutional Problems with the Resegregation
of Public Schools, 80 GEo7 L.J. 363, 364 n.9 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Kantrowitz, supra note 2, at 67 (reporting that students in all-male kinder-
garten and first-grade classes m Dade County, Florida, had higher attendance and test scores);
Carol Innerst, Schools Segregate Black Male Pupils, WASH. Tums, Oct. 19, 1990, at Al
(reporting that test scores and attitudes improved and that behavioral problems decreased in
Baltimore all-male elementary school classes); Waiters, supra note 5, at 8 (noting improved
performance in Baltimore).
9. Federal district court Judge George Woods ordered Detroit to open its proposed all-
male academy to girls. Garrett, 775 F Supp. 1004. Dade County converted its all-male program
to co-ed after the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education advised it that the
program constituted sex discrimination. Kenneth J. Cooper, Bush, Citing Boy Scouts, Backs
All-Boy Black Public Schools; President Criticizes Federal Ruling in Detroit Case, WASH. PosT,
Sept. 10, 1991, at A2.
10. When the issue of sex segregation has been raised, proponents of the all-male schools
have argued that sex discrimination was being used as a smokescreen to prevent focusing
attention on the proper issue of race. Ray, supra note 5, at A16. The controversy has
introduced the question of resegregating American education by creating all-male schools in
urban areas where the students are all likely to be African-American. The schools are seen as
an exercise in racial self-determination, an exercise blocked by those determined to perpetuate
the African-American underclass. Id.
However, others believe that the schools themselves will perpetuate the subordination of
Afncan-American males by further isolating and stigmatizing them. Innerst, supra note 8, at
Al (reporting that separate schools could "sendf the message that [Afncan-Amencan] males
are 'different' and incapable of learning alongside their peers of other races and cultures");
Ron Howell, Fighting a Cycle of Failure, NEwSDAY, Nov. 4, 1991, at 7 ("The schools will be
viewed largely as reformatones where problem youngsters go. They're not being established
for rocket scientists.") (quoting Professor Walter C. Farrell). "This is a way of stigmatizing
S [I]f through the discourse of stigma we can encourage the community to draw a ring
around blacks and herd them together, then the society has an easy target." MacNeil/Lehrer
NewsHour: Separate Equals Better?, Educational Broadcasting television broadcast, May 1,
1991, transcript available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Macleh File [hereinafter MacNeil/Lehrer]
(comment by Professor Charles Willie, Harvard Umversity). There is a "focus on [black males]
for 'special treatment' which is not special treatment or special attention but is really an
indictment of black males." Id. (comment by Michael Meyers, N.Y. Civil Rights Coalition).
11. Garrett, 775 F. Supp. at 1007 (noting that "[t]he primary rationale for the [male]
Academies is simply that co-educational programs aimed at improving male performance have
failed," and rejecting it because "there is no showing that it is the co-educational factor that
results in failure.").
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stance to take, for "should the male academies ... succeed, success would
be attributed to the absence of girls rather than any of the educational
factors that more probably caused the outcome."'' 2 Girls would be left in a
system that is clearly failing to meet their educational needs, while boys
would be given an option to try a better program." Not only would inner-
city girls be faced with the same, unalleviated problems they face now, they
would also face the additional stigma of discrimination. 14 This would
reinforce the idea, still far too prevalent in our society, that women,
especially African-American women, are second-class citizens and not enti-
tled to the same benefits and respect as men. Are we willing to pay that
price?
In all the furor over all-male urban public schools, the cost to urban
females is often overlooked. This Note examines the issue of single-gender
public schools by looking at both the costs and the benefits of such schools.15
Part I explores the principles underlying current equal protection doctrine
as well as a proposed modification of that doctrine. These principles form
the backdrop for examining involuntary gender segregation in Part II, and
voluntary separatism in Part III. This Note concludes that imposed gender
separation is never permissible. Under current doctrine, voluntary all-male
public schools are also impermissible, but certain all-female schools may be
allowed. Under the modified framework, single-gender schools for subor-
dinated groups are acceptable, but the price of all-male schools may be
more than we are willing to pay.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSES
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' 6 The language has been construed to encompass
two distinct principles.' 7 The first, anti-differentiation, appears to dominate,
but not control, current Supreme Court doctrine.'8 It holds that individuals
12. Id.
13. "Ignoring the plight of urban females institutionalizes inequality and perpetuates the
myth that females are doing well in the current system." Id.
14. A plausible argument can be made, though, that the stigma of such schools falls on
the males who attend them rather than the females who are excluded. See supra note 10.
15. The focus is on gender rather than race discrimination, but many of the arguments
for eliminating the subordination of women can be used for eliminating the subjugation of
racial minorities.
16. U.S. CorsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,
61 N.Y.U. L. Ray 1003 (1986); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have
Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1451
(1991).
18. Colker, supra note 17, at 1058.
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may not be treated differently on the basis of race, gender, or other
immutable characteristics. 9 Under this premise, governmental actions and
laws must be neutral-color-blind or gender-blind-to give individuals equal
protection under the law.2°
This vision of equality differs substantially from the anti-subordination
approach, 21 where equal protection means the elimination of subordination
in society.22 The facial neutrality or specificity of actions and policies is
irrelevant under this view; the focus is on their effect in perpetuating or
eliminating subordination. 23 The anti-subordination approach explains why
we find some classifications invidious and others harmless u It is this
principle which underlies the different treatment of race and gender discrim-
ination, the differing standards in statutory and constitutional analyses, and
the tension in affirmative action cases.2
Current Supreme Court doctrine is largely informed by the anti-differ-
entiation principle. 26 Under this principle, the equal protection clause is
implicated whenever a classification treats persons similarly situated in
different ways. 27 Once the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated, most
classifications need only meet a rational basis test to be found constitu-
tional.2 Other classifications, though, are subject to a higher level of
19. See id. at 1005. This principle has been variously called anti-differentiation, anti-
discrimination, the inequality approach, and the differences approach. See id. at 1005 n.6
(anti-differentiation); Roberts, supra note 17, at 1451 (anti-discnrmnation principle); Man J.
Matsuda, Legal Storytelling: Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story,
87 MICH. L. Ray. 2320, 2362 n.214 (1989) (inequality approach); CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON,
THE SEXUAL HARPRwrMENT oF WoRKING WoMEN 4 (1979) (differences approach).
20. Colker, supra note 17, at 1006.
21. This principle has also been termed anti-subjugation and the "expansive view" of equal
protection. See Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1336 (1986); Kimberl6 W Crenshaw, Race, Reform,
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrmination Law, 101 HARv.
L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1988).
22. See Man J. Matsuda, Comment: Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness
Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. Ray. 1763, 1768 (1990) (advocating a pragmatic methodology for
redressing subordination).
23. Roberts, supra note 17, at 1451; Colker, supra note 17 at 1007.
24. Colker, supra note 17, at 1007.
25. Id. at 1010. The tension anses when the Court tries to accomplish the goal of anti-
subordination with an anti-differentiation vehicle. But even though it uses anti-differentiation
language, the Court remains committed to the principle of anti-subordination. Id. at 1048;
Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1334-35.
26. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
27. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971). A law-such as one creating separate but
equal schools-which treats similarly-situated persons alike is not discriminatory under the
Equal Protection Clause, for "the benefits and detriments fall on both sexes with equal
measure." Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 886 (1975) (noting that use
of the rational basis test rather than intermediate scrutiny is justified when restrictions or
benefits apply equally to both sexes).
28. JoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrrurnONAL LAW § 14.3, at 574 (4th
ed. 1991).
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scrutiny. Classifications whose very nature makes them suspect-such as
race-must be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest before
they will be found constitutional. 29
Strict scrutiny in race discrimination cases has become "fatal in fact." 30
Virtually no race-specific policy is necessary to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest, and thus virtually no race-specific policy can be found
constitutional." The current doctrine, based on anti-differentiation, creates
road blocks to efforts to remove more deeply ingrained barriers to racial
equality. It has essentially "led to a rather awkward attempt to accommodate
race-specific remedies ordered for the purpose of redressing a particularly
egregious case of subordination."3 2 Affirmative action is difficult to justify
when people cannot be treated differently.
Gender discrimination is not subject to strict scrutiny under the anti-
differentiation approach, for there are actual differences between the genders
which may occasion differential treatment. 3 Problems anse, however, when
gender is used as a proxy for other, more appropriate bases of classifica-
tion.34 Until 1970, legislation using gender classification was evaluated under
the rational basis test.35 Since then, it has been subject to a level of scrutiny
somewhere between rational basis and strict scrutiny. 6 Craig v Boren
29. Id. § 14.3, at 575.
30. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv.
1, 8 (1972), quoted in Colker, supra note 17, at 1023.
31. Colker, supra note 17, at 1048. Under a strict anti-differentiation approach, race-
specific, affirmative action laws would not be permussible. The Supreme Court, though, has
rejected strict anti-differentiation arguments to find that affirmative action is indeed permissible
under certain circumstances. Id. at 1016; see also City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concumng) (indicating that a narrowly drawn statute showing a past
history of discrimination might survive constitutional scrutiny).
32. Colker, supra note 17, at 1048.
33. The Supreme Court has upheld statutes which "realistically reflectU the fact that the
sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances." Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (statutory rape); see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (draft
registration).
34. In Reed, for instance, gender was used statutorily as a proxy to deternmne the order
in which probate courts would appoint people to admimster intestate estates. The Court struck
this down as an inappropriate use of gender classification. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76. For more
examples, see Mississippi Umv. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 n.12 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding as "rational" a jury selection
system excluding women who did not affirmatively indicate a desire to serve), overruled by
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
36. The Court first applied something stronger than a true rational basis test in 1971.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71. In later opimons, some Justices urged strict scrutiny, while other Justices
proposed an intermediate level of scrutiny. Still others encouraged adherence to the less
exacting scrutiny of the rational basis standard. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). There is still a notable lack of consensus on the
Court: in Hogan, the vote was only 5-4 in reaffirming the Craig test. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718.
See generally David Hoffman, Challenges to Single-Sex Schools Under Equal Protection, 6
HRv. WOMEN's L.J. 163 (1983).
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defined this intermediate level of scrutiny: "[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge, [explicit] classifications by gender must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives. ' 3 7 A law which expressly treats the genders differently is con-
stitutional if it meets this reduced standard.38
The lower level of scrutiny in gender discrimination cases means that
some gender-specific classifications can pass constitutional muster. Unlike
the application of strict scrutiny in race cases, courts using intermediate
scrutiny do not inevitably find gender classifications to be fatally flawed.
Thus, "policies and laws that differentiate for the purpose of eliminating
subordination pass muster. ' 3 9 Unfortunately, "sex-specific policies or ac-
tions serving less important, often invidious, purposes also survive."' 4
Redressing subordination is not the only goal which could be termed an
"important and legitimate" governmental interest. 41 Indeed, even legislation
with a rationale that has the effect of subordinating a disempowered class
can withstand the lowered scrutiny of gender discrimination law 42
The tension between the results in race and gender discrimination cases
can be resolved by adopting a framework based on the anti-subordination
approach.41 Under such a framework, both facially neutral and explicitly
differentiating laws are subject to strict scrutiny when they treat people
differently or cause disparate impact which has a subordinating effect on
either women or minorities. 44 In order to prove a violation of equal
protection, the plaintiff must show a policy's subordinating impact on the
plaintiff's class. To defend or justify its discriminatory policy or action,
the government must demonstrate the beneficial effect on the subordinated
group.45 "A strict level of scrutiny can be preserved if it is recognized that
37. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197
38. Hogan clarified the test and broke it into three parts. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. The
classification "must have legitimate ends, these ends must be important, and there must be a
substantial relationship between these ends and the means used to attain them." Greenfeld,
supra note 7, at 369 (discussing Hogan test).
39. Colker, supra note 17, at 1048.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1041; see Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (finding goal of preventing teenage pregnancy
important enough to uphold statutory rape law which pumshed males but not females for
having sexual intercourse with underage partners); Rostker, 453 U.S. 57 (finding goal of
maintaimng and supporting armies sufficient to permit draft registration requirements for men
but not for women).
42. See Colker, supra note 17, at 1048.
43. Professor Ruth Colker proposed the framework which I describe and use here. Colker,
supra note 17, at 1058-63.
44. Id. at 1060-61. It would not be enough to show facial differentiation or disparate
impact; plaintiffs would have to show how the differentiation or disparate impact contributed
to their subordination. Id.
45. Id. at 1063. Professor Colker used Regents of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), to illustrate the effect of this distinction. Colker, supra note 17, at 1062-63. In
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the only justification for race- or sex-specific policies is the redress of a
prior experience or history of subordination." ' 46 If the courts applied this
framework, both race and gender discrimination would be treated the same,
and there would be no need to lower the level of scrutiny to redress
subordination.
II. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL SCHOOLS
A critical distinction must .be made between segregation imposed by
empowered groups and separatism chosen by disempowered groups.47 Each
method carries a different symbolic and practical impact.4" When a dominant
group excludes a subordinate group, it reinforces its own privileged position
and the stereotypes supporting it.49 In contrast, "socially subordinate groups
can be empowered by the exclusion of socially dominant groups."so The
term "separate but equal" connotes the exclusion of a disempowered group
by a dominant group, and will be used here to indicate imposed segregation."1
The issue of involuntary segregation into "separate but equal" schools
was definitively resolved by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education: "[I]n the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place."' 52 Brown dealt with schools separated by race, and
several subsequent cases by lower courts "implicit[ly] accept[ed] the notion
Bakke, the Court struck a race-conscious medical school admissions policy. Under Colker's
framework, the white plaintiff could not have made out a pnma facie case unless he could
show a subordinating disparate impact on white males. Even if he passed this hurdle, the
Umversity could have defended its policy at the justification stage by showing its effect was
to reduce subordination of minorities by creating opportunities in medicine where none had
existed before. Id.
46. Colker, supra note 17, at 1059 (emphasis in original).
47. Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 106, 122 (1986);
see also Colker, supra note 17, at 1051 (finding an inherent difference between imposed and
chosen segregation).
48. Rhode, supra note 47, at 122.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 118 (explaining that chosen separation may give subordinate groups opportunities
for self-expression and determination that would be inhibited by the presence of the dominant
group).
51. Historically, the phrase "separate but equal" has indicated an imposition and a lack
of choice. In public education, separate but equal meant that students were assigned to one
school and excluded from another on the basis of race or gender. Forced exclusion was a
motivating factor in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), where the Court,
reacting to a history of segregation forced upon the black minority by the white majority,
denounced "separate but equal" education. Colker, supra note 17, at 1051; see Kennedy,
supra note 21, at 1335-37; David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 938 (1989).
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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that separate facilities are more justifiable in the context of sex." '5 3 Never-
theless, Brown is the standard that should be followed in evaluating separate
but equal schools for boys and girls. 4 The anti-subordination basis for
Brown's abrogation of separate but equal schools in the racial context
supports its elimination in the gender context as well. The Court in Brown
focused on the harms resulting from segregation 5 and strove to eliminate
the subordination of African-Americans. 56
The decision in Brown is clearly consistent with Professor Colker's
framework. Brown's anti-subordination goal was evident in its conclusion
that "[s]egregation ... in public schools has a detrimental effect .... To
53. Cynthia Lewis, Plessy Revived: The Separate but Equal Doctrine and Sex-Segregated
Education, 12 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 585, 589 (1977). The separate but equal doctrine
persisted in the area of sexual discnmination long after its abrogation in the area of racial
discrimination. Patricia W Lamar, Comment, The Expansion of Constitutional and Statutory
Remedies for Sex Segregation in Education: The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, 32 EMORY L.J. 1111, 1113, 1119-35 (1983). Lamar notes
the persistence of the separate but equal doctrine in a number of sex discrimination cases. Id.,
see, e.g., Williams v. McNair, 316 F Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (upholding separate but equal
colleges for men and women), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d
86 (rex. Civ. App. 1958) (overturing lower court's finding that gender-separate but equal
schools were inherently unequal), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959); Allred v. Heaton, 336
S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (following Bristol).
54. Although I argue that Brown should be followed in gender cases as well as race cases,
there are others who question whether it should be followed at all. The decision in Brown has
been criticized for two very different reasons. First, the Court relied at least in part on Kenneth
Clark's study of the effect of discrimination on African-American children. WsIAi E. CRoss,
SHADEs OF BLACK 36 (1991). The validity of this study has since been seriously questioned.
See id. at 16-38. For instance, Clark used anecdotal data gathered from clinically disturbed
African-American children to hypothesize that Afican-Amencans in general experienced self-
hatred because of their race. Id. at 28-29. Clark saw 'Negroness' as a stigma," id. at 37
(emphasis in original), and the Supreme Court seemed to adopt his view. See generally Kevin
Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De Jure Segregation to Replicate the
Disease?, 72 CoRNLL L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). Such a basis for Brown seems to undercut
the freedom of equality that it has come to represent.
Brown has also been criticized as an act of white self-interest rather than a genuine attempt
to help a subordinated minority. DERRIcK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAw § 7.11.3
(2d ed. 1980). Professor Bell argues that Brown has been of "greater value to whites than
[to] blacks." Id. It provided, among other benefits, "immediate credibility to America's
struggle . to win the hearts and minds of emerging third-world peoples. Specific
arguments to this effect were advanced" in the briefs for Brown. Id. Such a basis for Brown
again appears to diminish it as a symbol of equality.
It is possible that the Justices were moved by these reasons. It is more probable, however,
that their decision stemmed from a variety of motivations, conscious and subconscious, "good"
and "bad." In a mixed-motive case, a common test is to see if a decision comes out the same
way in the absence of the illegitimate motives. I argue that a court basing its decision solely
on the principle of anti-subordination would find forced segregation by race or sex as
impermissible as the Court in Brown did.
55. Lewis, supra note 53, at 620. "We must look to the effect of segregation itself."
Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
56. See Colker, supra note 17, at 1014, 1022 (noting that the central concern was remedying
the subordination of blacks); Kennedy, supra note 21, at 1336 (asserting that Brown stands
for the principle that any imposition of racial subjugation is unconstitutional).
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separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely
because of race generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone."3' 7 Children in a
socially subordinate group-whether African-Americans or females-sense
that they have been forcibly excluded from association with the dominant
group because they are different and somehow less valuable. In an unequal
society, the very fact of involuntary segregation stigmatizes the subordinate
group.58 That stigma generates a feeling of inferiority that is especially
dangerous in school, for it is there that children form their self-identities
and learn their place in society. 59 These children are handicapped in their
pursuit of an education by their sense of inferiority.60 Even when all tangible,
measurable factors61 of education are the same for both groups, the intan-
gible factors are not. 62 As the Court in Brown noted, in an unequal society
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 63
Even though the reasoning in Brown easily encompassed both race and
gender, courts after Brown remained willing to apply the "separate but
equal" analysis to uphold gender-segregated schools.6 Indeed, Williams v.
McNair went so far as to find a "school for young ladies," which purported
to fit women for "such ... arts as may be suitable to their sex" (such as
needlework, cooking, housekeeping, and secretarial skills), equal to a pres-
tigious men's military college. 61 Williams and subsequent cases illustrated
57. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
58. "Segregation makes a reality of the belief underlying it, that the objects of the
discrimination are different-indeed, separated-from humanity." James S. Liebman, Deseg-
regating Politics: "All-Out" Desegregation Explained, 90 CoLum. L. REV. 1463, 1570 (1990),
quoted in Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 382; see supra note 10 (regarding fear that separation
will stigmatize African-American boys).
59. "[B]ecause of the unique importance of education in our society, the effects of sex
segregation in schools may extend to many other facets of life." Lewis, supra note 53, at 606;
see also Weis, supra note 3, at 34 ("[S]chools serve as sites whereby particular kinds of student
identities are encouraged and formed.").
60. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950)
(holding that by setting plaintiff, an African-American, apart from white students, the state
handicapped plaintiff by impairing his ability to study and learn).
61. Tangible factors in high school can include: size of campus, number of books in
library, number of faculty with graduate degrees, course offerings in math and science,
extracurricular activities, and college entrance exam scores. See ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQuAl.
EDUCATION UNDER LAW 121 (1986).
62. Courts have been concerned with intangible factors in evaluating the equality of the
schools; such factors may include prestige of the school, power of alumni, chance to make
valuable contacts, reputation of the faculty, and experience of the administration. See SALo-
MoNE, supra note 61, at 121, Richard W Brunette, Note, Single-Sex Public Schools: The Last
Bastion of "Separate but Equal"?, 1977 DutrE L.J. 259, 268-69.
63. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
64. See. supra note 53 and accompanying text.
65. Williams v. McNair, 316 F Supp. 134, 136 n.3 (D.S.C. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S.
951 (1971). This reasoning, similar to that used in race cases before Brown, was followed in
later cases. Vorchhenmer v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), for
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the courts' view that gender segregation was more justifiable than racial
segregation. 6 Indeed, Williams has been used as authority for the idea that
gender-"separate but equal" schools are permissible.67
While it is true that Williams and its ilk supported gender segregation
even after Brown, subsequent cases and statutes have undermined the
authority they might otherwise have had. Section 203(a)(1) of the Equal
Education Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) found that separate is not
equal for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment;6s Congress declared
that public gender-segregated school systems violate the Constitution. 69
Subsequent decisions and legislation have compromised the case law sup-
porting gender segregation. The court based its decision in Williams on the
finding that the state's scheme for separate colleges was rationally related
to its legitimate goal of providing education. Later cases, though, established
that gender-based classifications are subject to a higher level of scrutiny
than the rational basis test employed in Williams.70 Such classifications must
now meet the intermediate level of scrutiny described in Craig v. Boren:
"To withstand constitutional challenge, . . classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to the achievement of those objectives." ' 7'
The difference between applying intermediate scrutiny and the rational
basis test is illustrated by Vorchhezmer v. School District of Philadelphian
and Newburg v. Board of Public Education.73 Both cases involved challenges
to Philadelphia's Central High, an all-male academic high school, and its
female counterpart, Girls High. Vorchheimer, decided before Craig, used a
rational basis test to uphold a "separate but equal" scheme for the academic
high schools, finding that it bore a "substantial relation" to legitimate
governmental objectives. 74 When the same plan was challenged again after
Craig, the Newburg court struck it as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 75 The Newburg court held that the
plan could not pass the substantial relationship test required under Craig;
example, held that Girls High was equal to Central High, the boys school, even though Central
had a stronger program in math and sciences. A later court found that the schools were not
equal. Newburg v. Board of Pub. Educ., 9 Phila. Cty. Rep. 556 (1983) (criticizing Vorchhenmer).
66. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; Colker, supra note 17, at 1024 (noting that
the Court was unconcerned about women's subordination until the 1970s).
67. See, e.g., Vorchhenner, 532 F.2d at 887.
68. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (1988).
69. Id., see infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
71. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
72. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976).
73. 9 Phila. Cty. Rep. 556 (1983).
74. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 887-88.
75. Newburg, 9 Phila. Cty. Rep. at 576. The court also found that the plan could not
meet the strict scrutiny required under the state equal rights amendment. Id. Its decision,
however, was based on the equal protection violation. Id. at 571.
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it noted the absence of an "important governmental objective" and found
that the separation of boys and girls was "not 'substantially related' to the
'vague, unsubstantiated theory' that adolescents may study more effectively
in single-sex schools." 76 The "separate but equal" doctrine thus could not
withstand the stronger scrutiny required now for sex-based classifications. 77
Even if "separate but equal" treatment of the genders in public education
is somehow found to be constitutional, it is still prohibited by federal
statute. In the legislative findings of the EEOA, Congress declared that
"the maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned to
schools [on the basis of gender] denies to those students" rights guaranteed
by the Constitution.78 The EEOA thus prohibits assigning students to
separate but equal school systems. It "incorporates a judgment that a sex-
segregated school distnct ... results in similar if not equivalent injury to
children" as a racially segregated system.7 9 Congress realized that the
subjugation suffered by girls in a gender-segregated system was similar to
the subjugation suffered by African-Americans m a racially segregated
system. As the anti-subordination goal underlying Brown applies to both
types of segregation, so should its holding. Constitutional considerations
aside, under the EEOA "in the field of public education, the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place." 8
III. SINGLE-GENDER SCHOOLS
"Separate but equal" schools are not the only kind of gender-segregated
education. Indeed, the recent resurgence in segregated education has been
of another type altogether: single-gender schools offered as a voluntary
76. SALomoNE, supra note 61, at 120 (footnote omitted) (quoting the language in Newburg,
9 Phila. Cty. Rep. at 570). Commentators today are divided on whether such a plan could be
constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny of Craig.
77. See Newburg, 9 Phila. Cty. Rep. at 570; SALOMONE, supra note 61, at 120.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(I) (1988).
79. United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 560 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1977). However,
the EEOA does allow sex-segregated classes within a school. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1988). This
apparent anomaly between the EEOA's declared intent and the consequence of its plain
language is discussed in Part III of this Note. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
80. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). But note that the EEOA prohibits
only the assignment of students to sex-segregated schools; it does not expressly prohibit students
or parents from voluntarily choosing a sex-segregated school. When the state offers students
a choice between co-education and single-sex schools for both sexes, the proper analysis is not
that for "separate but equal" schools, which implies a lack of choice, see supra note 51, but
that for single-sex schools. It is important, then, to determne if there is truly a choice between
co-ed and single-sex schools. In Vorchheimer, for example, the court mistakenly assumed that
the plaintiff had a choice between a co-ed general igh school and a single-sex academic
(college-preparatory) one. See Caren Dubnoff, Does Gender Equality Always Imply Gender
Blindness? The Status of Single-Sex Education for Women, 86 W VA. L. Rnv 295, 312
(1984). She could not choose to attend a co-ed acadermc high school, however, because the
district did not offer one. Id., Brunette, supra note 62, at 272.
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alternative to co-ed schools. Separatism chosen by subordinate groups carries
a different significance than that chosen by dominant groups."1 All-girls
schools and all-boys schools have different impacts on subordinated groups
and are therefore examned separately in this Note. Under both constitu-
tional and statutory analysis, all-boys schools do not survive the scrutiny,
while all-girls schools do.
A. Constitutionality of Single-Gender Schools
To be constitutional under current doctrine, single-gender schools must
be able to withstand the intermediate scrutiny of the Craig test.8 This lower
standard of scrutiny, which demands only that gender classifications be
related to "important and legitimate" goals, allows subordinating as well
as compensatory rationales to justify gender separation. Under the anti-
subordination approach, however, the only justification for gender segre-
gation in public schools would be the elimination of subordination. By
rejecting other justifications as either illegitimate or unimportant, the Su-
preme Court seems to be moving toward this standard.
Some statutory objectives for single-gender schools have been rejected as
archaic or stereotypical, and thus illegitimate. In Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, the Supreme Court noted that "[c]are must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and ster-
eotypic notions."83 Such notions help to perpetuate subordination. Immersed
as we are in a culture full of "fixed notions concerning the roles and
abilities of males and females," we may find it difficult to perceive some
stereotypes for what they are.84 Sometimes, of course, the stereotype may
be blatant: the statutory goals for a number of historically all-female schools
are quaintly archaic. 5 The mission of Winthrop College in South Carolina,
for example, was to "fit [women] for teaching ... stenography,... sewing,
... art, needlework, cooking, housekeeping and such other .. arts as
may be suitable to their sex .... ,,s6 These schools were designed to prepare
girls for their "proper"-that is, stereotypical-role as wives, mothers, and
helpmeets by teaching them culinary, domestic, and secretarial skills. Not
81. Rhode, supra note 47, at 122; see also Colker, supra note 17, at 1051 (noting the
"inherent qualitative difference").
82. "To withstand constitutional challenge, [explicit] classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
83. 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (striking down a nursing school's admission policy which
excluded men).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. at 720 n.1; Williams v. McNair, 316 F Supp. 134, 136 n.3 (D.S.C. 1970),
aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
86. Williams, 316 F Supp. 134, 136 n.3.
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coincidentally, these "suitable" skills prepared young women for un- or
under-paid positions which men generally shunned as low-status "women's
work." A statutory objective which perpetuates gender inequities by relying
on stereotypes such as these cannot be legitimate.
Statutory objectives must also avoid the "proxy" label to meet the Craig
test. The Supreme Court has rejected "the simplistic, outdated assumption
that gender could be used as a 'proxy for other, more germane bases of
classification."' 8 7 Again, careful attention is needed to perceive proxy clas-
sifications in our engendered society. Gender has often been used as a proxy
for admstrative convenience. 8 Rather than identifying and focusing on
the real group for which the legislation is designed, it is easier for the
legislature to define the group as the gender which either predominates the
group or is commonly associated with it.
Detroit, for example, found that its urban youths were facing soaring
drop-out, unemployment, and homicide rates. To combat the problem, the
Detroit school board established all-male academies "to provide a remedial
atmosphere for boys who might otherwise fall behind or be lost alto-
gether." 89 Because many people associated the problems faced by Detroit
youths with boys, the school board defined the group in need as "boys."
When the academies were challenged for discrimination, the court found
that the Detroit plan "inappropriately relie[d] on gender as a proxy for 'at-
risk' students." 90 A more legitimate goal would be to provide a remedial
atmosphere for those students at risk of falling behind or dropping out,
regardless of gender. Detroit, however, used "boys" as a proxy for students,
and thus created an illegitimate classification.
Other statutory objectives, while legitimate, have been rejected as insuf-
ficient. Promoting innovation and diversity in educational methods has
frequently been asserted as a legitimate state interest. The court in Williams
v. McNair justified the exclusion of men from a fimshing school "for
young ladies" by noting that "flexibility and diversity in educational meth-
ods, when not tainted with racial overtones, often are both desirable and
beneficial; they should be encouraged, not condemned." 9' The reasomng in
Williams was later given additional support by Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, where the Supreme Court held that "attainment of a
diverse student body ... is a clearly constitutionally permissible goal
..... 92 Bakke and Williams both involved collegiate education, but diver-
87. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 726 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 198); see also supra note 34.
88. See, e.g., Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313
(1977).
89. Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 369.
90. Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991); see Nightline,
supra note 2 (questioning "whether young people can be labeled as 'at-nsk' or 'troubled'
simply for gender [and] not [for] individual performance").
91. 316 F Supp. 134, 138 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951 (1971).
92. 438 U.S. 265, 311-12 (1978).
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sity has been used to justify single-gender lugh schools as well. 93 Indeed, at
the high school level, a lower court found "the need to allow innovation
in methods and techniques ... to be adequate justification for segregation
by sex .... ."94 Diversity was thus both an important and legitimate goal
in the lower court's view.
The Supreme Court, though, disagreed with the lower court. While it
found that diversity is a legitimate and permissible state interest, it also
found it to be inadequate. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,9
the Court indicated that diversity alone is an insufficient state interest to
support a gender-based classification.
Since any gender-based classification provides one class a benefit or
choice not available to the other class, [the diverse opportunity] argument
begs the question. The issue is not whether the benefitted class profits
from the classification, but whether the State's decision to confer a
benefit only upon one class . . is substantially related to achieving a
legitimate and substantial goal."
The mere fact that gender segregation allows diversity in educational meth-
ods and opportunities is not enough, then, to qualify it as an important
state interest under Craig. Hogan opened the door for the Supreme Court
to insist upon an anti-subordination justification as a "legitimate goal."
Despite the Supreme Court's concern with the goals of anti-subordination,
the reduced scrutiny in current equal protection doctnne allows other
objectives to justify gender discrimination. For example, courts have rec-
ognized that convenience,97 promoting equality of education, 9s and redressing
past discrimination" are important and legitimate state interests. 1°° Under
the strict scrutiny, anti-subordination framework, only the elimination of
93. See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. School Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976)
(finding that innovation in educational methods to achieve a high-quality education is a relevant
goal), aff'd, 430 U.S. 703 (1977).
94. Brunette, supra note 62, at 267 (quoting Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 888).
95. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
96. Id. at 731 n.17.
97. The majority m Hogan noted that a woman in the male plaintiff's position "would
not have been required to choose between foregoing credit and bearing that mconvenience"
of driving a considerable distance to attend a nursing school. Id. at 724 n.8. In dissent, Justice
Powell protested that "there is no constitutional right to attend a state-supported university
in one's hometown." Id. at 736.
98. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
99. Id. at 1128; see also Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728.
i00. There may be at least one other important goal: providing educational opportunities
for all citizens. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 722. But providing a unique opportunity for one sex
and not for the other is unlikely to ever be substantially related to the goal of providing
education to all of its citizens. It is difficult to imagine how a state could achieve the goal of
educating all of its citizens by excluding half of them from an educational institution. In
Hogan, for example, the state failed to show that providing a unique educational opportunity
for women, but not men, was related to the goal of providing education for all. Id.
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subordination through redressing past discrimination and promoting equality
would justify gender classifications.
If a governmental objective is important and legitimate, the next step of
the Craig test is to determine if the exclusion of one gender is substantially
related to accomplishing these recognized goals. 101 Providing conveniently
located educational facilities for one gender, but not for the other, is not
likely to ever be substantially related to the goal of providing convenient
locations for all citizens.' 0 2 But excluding one gender can be substantially
related to the goals of promoting equal opportunity and redressing past
discrimination. When members of one gender have been discriminated
against, or have been denied equal opportunity on the basis of their gender,
the state may give preferential treatment to that gender. 0 3 In our society,
women and minorities are often denied equal opportunity with white men;
providing educational opportunities free from discrimnation may help them
overcome their second-class status.
Voluntary single-gender schools can be substantially related to the statu-
tory goal of redressing discrimination if they can meet a number of require-
ments. These conditions were set out in Hogan.'04 The Court there noted
that the compensatory purpose doctrine will uphold gender classifications
only if: (1) the group benefitting under the classification has in fact suffered
a disadvantage related to the classification; (2) the single-gender policy was
adopted with the intention of overcoming those disadvantages; (3) the single-
gender program is not based on stereotypes, nor does it perpetuate them;
and (4) the classification is substantially and directly related to the compen-
satory objective105
Only when the first three requirements have been met does the court
examine the substantiality of the relationship between the means and the
end. The relationship must be direct and substantial, for this ensures "that
the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned analysis rather
than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate,
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women."' 6 The means
need not be absolutely necessary to achieve the end; it is enough that they
are closely related.' °7 If a single-gender program cannot meet the necessary
I01. Id. at 725.
102. In Hogan, the state offered a femaie-only nursing school, but failed to provide an
equally convement location for men who wished to study nursing. Id.
103. See id. at 728.
104. Id. at 728-29, 730 n.16.
105. Chai R. Feldblum et al., Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 171, 210-11 (1986).
106. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26.
107. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d- 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1982); T.
Page Johnson, No Boys Allowed on the Volleyball Team, 60 EDuc. L. REP. 313, 317 (1990).
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criteria to invoke the compensatory doctrine, it may still be constitutional
under the Craig test if it is substantially related to the state interest in
promoting equal opportunity. Redressing discnmination is just one subset
of the broader goal of promoting equality, 08 so the program will pass
constitutional scrutiny if excluding one gender is directly related to pro:-
moting equal opportunity between the genders.
1. Relationship of All-Male Programs to
"Important and Legitimate" Governmental Objectives
Voluntary all-male programs in public education do not promote equal
opportunity between the genders, nor do they serve to redress subordination.
Even all-male schools designed to help inner-city African-Amencan boys
overcome subordination fail to meet the test outlined in Hogan1° 9 In order
to do so, the school district or the state must show that boys suffer
disadvantages because they are boys, and that excluding girls is directly
related to redressing these disadvantages. While inner-city boys have unde-
mably suffered disadvantages, it is questionable whether those disadvantages
are related to their gender rather than to their race or socio-economc class,
or some combination of the three." 0 After all, urban African-Amencan
girls suffer many of the same disadvantages as the boys.' But even if the
disadvantages inner-city boys suffer are related to their gender, the all-male
programs designed to overcome those disadvantages are not likely to pass
the third and fourth prongs of the Hogan test.
The third prong of the compensatory purpose doctnne outlined in Hogan
states that single-gender programs should neither be based upon nor per-
petuate stereotypes." 2 Depending upon whether all-male public schools are
perceived as positive or negative can lead to the perpetuation of different
stereotypes. If an all-male public school or class is viewed as benefitting
the students who attend it, then excluding girls from enjoying the benefit
perpetuates the stereotype of women as second-class citizens."' If the
108. Virginia P. Croudace & Steven Desmarais, Where the Boys Are: Can Separate Be
Equal m School Sports?, 58 S. CAi. L. Ray. 1425, 1451 (1985).
109. See supra text accompanying note 105.
110. Indeed, it is questionable whether the effects of race, gender, and social class can ever
be separated. See, e.g., Lois Wins, HIGH SCHOOL AS A SITE FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF
WHm MALE DOMINANCE 35 (1990).
111. The crisis facing boys, though, is perceived to be more critical than that facing girls.
See generally Thomas, supra note 2.
112. See supra text accompanying note 105.
113. All-male public schools can perpetuate sex discrimination in two ways: by telling girls
they "don't belong" and by telling boys that they are "better" than girls. Nightline, supra
note 2. "[You're saying girls don't belong, girls are part of the problem [and telling
boys] that they're better and that they can have special education and that girls don't deserve
the special education." Id. (comment by Helen Newborne, National Organization for Women's
Legal Defense and Education Fund). There is also "a macho behavior being established that's
going to create a male superiority " Id. "[I]solating these boys in these male academies
reinforces 'macho' behavior that hurts girls." Id.
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program is seen as one for "problem" kids, then singling out African-
American boys for special attention stigmatizes them. 1 14 Thus, the schools
either exacerbate the troubles inner-city boys now face, or they alleviate
those problems by perpetuating a stereotype of male superiority. Either
way, the all-male programs fail.
Furthermore, an all-male education is not substantially related to any of
the state interests which have been recognized as important and legitimate
in gender classifications. While it is true that some educators believe that
all-male schools can greatly benefit boys,"' that is not at issue. Certainly
providing a unique educational opportunity to one gender will benefit
members of that gender. The issue is whether the exclusion of girls can be
justified by showing that it is substantially related to promoting equal
opportunity between the genders or to redressing past discrimination against
boys."16
Evidence of such a nexus is unlikely.17 Indeed, research shows that the
presence of girls in the classroom "enhance[s] male achievement.""' In co-
ed classes, teachers give more time and attention to boys." 9 They direct
114. See supra notes 10 and 14. The programs "institutionalize stereotypes about black
males and focus on them for 'special treatment' which is not special treatment . but
really is an indictment of black males It's a blaming the victim approach." MacNeill
Lehrer, supra note 10 (comments by Michael Meyers).
115. See Williams v. McNair, 316 F Supp. 134, 137 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 951
(1971); United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (W.D. Va. 1991). But see Emmanuel
Jimenez & Marlaine E. Lockheed, Enhancing Girls' Learning Through Single-Sex Education,
11(2) EDUC. EvAL. & POL'Y ANALYsIs 117, 120 (1989) (finding that evidence of benefits of
single-sex schools for boys is mixed).
116. If the program excludes girls, the state must show that the "presence of girls in the
classroom bears a substantial relationship to the difficulties facing urban males." Garrett v.
Board of Educ., 775 F Supp. 1004, 1007 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
117. One commentator argues that because boys generally fare worse academically than
girls, they suffer a disadvantage related to their sex. Greenfeld, supra note 7, at 36970. The
problem lies m showing that boys actually do suffer this disadvantage; one cannot rely on
stereotypes. All at-risk students are not boys. The statistics cited to support the need for all-
male programs demonstrate only that boys are doing poorly; no comparable statistics are given
about girls except those showing that they drop out almost as often as boys. See supra notes
3-5 and 9. As the trial judge in the Detroit case noted, "[g]irls fail, too." Walters, supra note
5, at 8.
118. Jimenez & Lockheed, supra note 115, at 120, 125 (finding that coeducation enhances
boys' acadermc achievement and that the effects of all-male education are mixed); see Valerie
E. Lee & Marlaine E. Lockheed, The Effects of Single-Sex Schooling on Achievement and
Attitudes in Nigeria, Comp. EDuc. Rlv., May 1990, at 209, 225 (noting that "boys who attend
single-sex schools score signifijantiy below their male coeducational school counterparts.").
119. MIcEziiE STANWORTH, GENDER AND ScHooLINo: A STUDY OF SExUAL DivisIoNs IN THE
CLASSROOM 38-41 (Hutchinson Publishing Group 1983) (finding preferential treatment of boys
in the classroom); Nanette Asimov, Schools Unfair to Girls, SAN FRANcisco CHRON., Feb. 12,
1992, at Al (reporting results of study by American Association of University Women (AAUW),
which compiled data from "an array of research on girls and education"); Ric Burrous,
Women's Studies Conference Explores School and Girls, I.U. NEwsPAPER, Nov. 15, 1991, at
2 (copy on file with the INDLANA LAW JOURNAL) (noting results of AAUW study).
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more questions at boys than girls,' ° praise boys more often,'2 ' and call
boys by name more often than girls.'2 "[Students] tend to see this as
evidence that boys ... are more capable, and more highly valued, than
girls."''  Boys in co-ed classes thus gain a higher opimon of themselves and
of their gender, increasing their self-esteem.'2 It is the presence, not the
absence, of girls which builds male self-esteem and confidence. Unless the
state can prove that boys suffer an educational disadvantage due to the
presence of girls in the classroom, it cannot prove a substantial relationship
to the compensatory purpose.
A state is also unlikely to show that excluding girls from all-boys schools
promotes equal opportunity between the genders. Males are dominant in
our society; even among disempowered, inner-city African-Americans, men
dominate women.'1 Creating all-male institutions "reinforce[s] [men's] priv-
ileged positions and the stereotypes underlying them."'12 Rather than pro-
moting equal opportunity, all-boys schools preserve male dominance. 27 Such
schools carry a message about the relative positions of men and women. In
an unequal society, the exclusion of a subordinate group from association
with the dominant group emphasizes the difference in power between them.
The existence of all-boys schools inculcates girls with the message that they
are not entitled to all of the privileges that boys are; they are second-class
citizens. 1' The "exclusion of women, like that of racial or religious minor-
ities, carries a stigma that affects individuals' social status and self-percep-
tion.' 2 9 Stigmatized and excluded, girls are denied the very equality of
opportunity that the gender classification is supposed to promote.
120. STANwoRTH, supra note 119, at 37; Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 178 n.26; see
also Burrous, supra note 119.
121. STANWORTH, supra note I19, at 37; Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 175.
122. Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 178 n.26.
123. STANWORTu, supra note 119, at 43.
124. Id. at 41, 51.
125. "What it means to be a woman witun any specific culture blurs at the margins, but
the core meaning is crystal clear. It means being subordinated to men, having less power
Regardless of racial, ethnic, age or class solidarity with men, women across cultural chasms
have a shared experience of subordination based on their sex " Leslie Bender, Sex
Discrimination or Gender Inequality?, 57 FoRDHAm L. Rnv. 941, 949 (1989).
126. Rhode, supra note 47, at 122.
127. "[M]ale pre-emnnence [was] found uniformly m the school classrooms we observed."
Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 175 n.17 (quoting MARL.iNE E. LocrinD & ABAGAIL M.
HARus, A SruDY IN SEx EQurrY n CLASSROOM INTERACTION: FnAL REPORT (1984)). "Restnc-
tive membership policies of all-male organizations. . have often served to keep women out
of positions of power and potential growth, and to perpetuate the view of women as a weak
or inferior group." Id. at 171.
128. See Bender, supra note 125, at 949 (Being a woman "means being subordinated to
men, having less power . "); Brunette, supra note 62, at 271 n.61) ("[S]ingle-sex schools
inculcatfe] and reinforc[e] those values which [lead] men to positions of power and women
to positions of subservience."); Nightline, supra note 2 (asserting that all-male schools imply
that "girls don't deserve the special education").
129. Rhode, supra note 47, at 108.
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Creating or permitting all-boys public education is not substantially related
to any of the recognized goals of gender classification. These schools and
programs do not promote gender equality or redress past gender discnmu-
nation, nor do they serve to educate all of a state's citizens. Without this
vital link to legitimate and important state interests, all-male public edu-
cation cannot pass the Craig test. Such schools violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Relationship of All-Girls Programs to
"Important and Legitimate" Governmental Objectives
All-girls public schools, on the other hand, can bear a substantial rela-
tionship to important and legitimate statutory goals. Like all-boys schools,
all-girls schools can benefit their students greatly. 130 Again, though, the
central issue is their ability to satisfy the Craig test by serving recognized
state interests. 3' All-girls public education can do so by compensating for
past and current discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity.
All-female education can satisfy the compensatory purpose doctrine set
out in Hogan. Classifications benefitting girls meet the first condition of
the Hogan test, for girls actually are discriminated against on the basis of
their gender.3 2 The next two conditions are harder to meet. It is unlikely,
for example, that many of the all-girls public schools currently existing were
established with the intent of overcoming discrimination. Indeed, most were
created to prepare girls for stereotypically fermnne careers as housewives,
teachers, nurses, or secretaries. 33 That the school has since become devoted
to preparing girls for nontraditional careers is irrelevant under Hogan; the
inquiry focuses on the stated intent of the legislation or ordinance estab-
lishing the school. 3 4 These historically all-girls schools are based on stereo-
typical notions of the proper role of women, and therefore fail to meet the
third criterion. They may also perpetuate such stereotypes by excluding men
from traditionally feminine careers. 35 Perpetuation of stereotypes fosters
gender discrimination and thus completely undermines the compensatory
effort.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
131. See supra text accompanying note 116.
132. The compensation does not have to be for specific discnunation made by the
compensating institution. "The fact that some of those effects may lie in social attitudes makes
them no less real." Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 886 F.2d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir.
1989); see also Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982)
(finding it permissible to redress society's longstanding disparate treatment of women), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
134. See Hoffman, supra note 36, at 169 (noting that if not bound by previously asserted
goals, the Craig test loses all rigor).
135. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729 (1982).
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Although the compensatory purpose doctrine could not be used to uphold
many existing programs, new all-female schools and programs could be
established with the intent of overcoming gender discrinmnation and the
stereotypes underlying it. Rather than being based upon or perpetuating
stereotypical views of women, these programs would prepare girls for
nontraditional careers and lives. Such schools would meet the first three
criteria set out in Hogan. They would also meet the final requirement,
because an all-girls school designed to overcome gender discrimination by
eliminating stereotypes and preparing students for nontraditional careers
would be directly related to the statutory goal of redressing the effects of
discrimination.
Whether a school promotes equal opportunity for the genders is a function
of the social effect that the school has. An all-girls public school creates
different social consequences than does an all-boys school. "When males
are excluded from all-female organizations in today's society, this exclusion
does not create the same stigma or economic disadvantages as does the
exclusion of females from all-male organizations." 1 16 "[A]ssociations of
disempowered groups carry different social meanings than associations of
empowered groups . ,,137 Students, regardless of race or socio-economic
status, are taught that men are the domnant gender and that being a girl
means being subordinated to men. 138 The social cost of excluding boys is
not their subsequent feelings of inferiority, for their sense of power is too
well entrenched. Instead they perceive that girls are inferior because they
will not compete with boys. 39 There is a danger too that girls might choose
the single-gender school over the co-ed one because they believe it must be
less competitive, thus reinforcing their own sense of personal and gender
infenority. 4° These social costs must be outweighed by counteracting factors
which promote equal opportunity if an all-girls school is to be substantially
related to that end.' 41
Those costs are outweighed. All-girls schools promote equality of oppor-
tunity by providing girls with an educational atmosphere free of the inhi-
bitions, restrictions, and discrimination which are the hallmark of co-
136. Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 216.
137. Rhode, supra note 47, at 109.
138. See STwoRTH, supra note 119, at 43-44; Bender, supra note 125, at 949.
139. "Mhe idea of providing schools to which women may escape from male competition
perpetuates stereotypes of female inferiority " Lewis, supra note 53, at 641. Yet there is
also merit in the idea that providing a haven dunng critical years may be necessary to establish
the self-esteem upon which later success can be based. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying
text.
140. See Lewis, supra note 53, at 645 (noting that girls may choose single-sex schools
because they are reluctant to compete with boys).
141. "The issue is not simply whether single-sex [schools] are beneficial, but whether
experiences of commensurate value are available in [co-ed settings] with fewer social costs."
Rhode, supra note 47, at 125.
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educational schools.1'4 2 "Sex inequities characteristic of society are found in
abundance in co-ed classrooms."' 43 Girls in co-ed classes are subjected to
"sexual harassment in forms ranging from systematic humiliation to physical
abuse"'" and to "interpersonal interactions designed to subtly reinforce sex
differences and sex stereotyping."'145 "Patterns of domination and control
are expressed in graffiti, sexist comments and assaults. . . Under such a
regime girls' ability to think and express their thoughts independently and
creatively is necessarily stifled."'"4 Subtle or overt, co-ed schools contain
significant gender-based discrimination which serves to limit girls' self-
perception and create a sense of inferiority and second-class status. 47
Students in c9-ed classrooms are treated differently on the basis of their
gender. Teachers give more time and attention to boys.'" They will often
wait longer for a boy to answer a question before going on, and they are
more likely to "help" a girl by providing the answer rather than allowing
her to work out the solution for herself.' 49 The striking dominance of boys
in the classroom has a singular effect: "[g]irls appear to boys-and more
importantly, to themselves-as less capable than they 'really' are."' 50 The
resulting atmosphere "virtually guarantees the perpetuation of secondary
status for women."'' "Although they share the same classrooms, the
experience of classroom life is clearly not the same for girls and boys....
The experiences they have there are an important source of evaluations of
their own, and the other, sex . . ."152 Boys and girls learn that girls are
quiet, passive, and not quite as smart as boys. Co-ed schools thus perpetuate
the subordination of women in our society. An all-girls school may offer
142. See generally W£is, supra note 110.
143. SUsAN KLEIN, HANDBOOK FOR AcHiviNG SEX EQUITY THROUGH EDUCATION 189 (1985).
"[M]ale pre-eminence [was] found uniformly in the school classrooms we observed mhe
classrooms served as environments in which inequities could flounsh " Feldblum et
al., supra note 105, at 175 (quoting LOCKHEED & HARius, supra note 127, 7-4). Co-ed schools
produce inequities and encourage the formation of identities which serve such inequities. Weis,
supra note 3, at 34.
144. David Milman & Katherine de Gama, Sexual Discrimination in Education: One Step
Forward, Two Steps Back?, J. Soc. WELFARE L., No. 1, 1989, at 4, 6.
145. KLEIN, supra note 143, at 189.
146. Milman & de Gama, supra note 144, at 21.
147. Deborah Bachrach et al., Women and Poverty: Women's Issues in Legal Services
Practice, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REv 1035, 1048 (1981); STANWORTH, supra note 119, at 43-44;
see also Women's Ass'n Report: Girls Shortchanged in School, DAILY REPORT CARD, Feb. 12,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Rptcrd File (finding that sexual harrassment of girls
in school is increasing). A 1990 study linked girls' low self-esteem to the different treatment
of boys and girls, which led to a decreased interest in math and science among girls. Burrous,
supra note 119, at 2.
148. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
149. Burrous, supra note 119, at 2.
150. STANWORTH, supra note 119, at 44.
151. Bachrach et al., supra note 147, at 1050.
152. STANWORTH, supra note 119, at 40-41.
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an alternative to counteract this hidden curriculum." 3 Indeed, "[s]inge-sex
schooling may be a necessary ... prerequisite for real equality. '" 4
Excluding boys from the learning environment can be a critical tool in
overcoming gender discrimination. All-girls schools can give girls a discrim-
ination-free haven in which to study and develop the skills they will need
to successfully compete m society. 5 So long as the school is geared toward
overcoming gender-based stereotypes instead of perpetuating them, it will
promote equal opportunity by giving girls a respite from ,daily discrmuna-
tion. Such schools "have fostered greater verbal assertiveness, higher career
aspirations, more intellectual self-esteem, [and] expanded leadership oppor-
tunities .... 1.6 Without boys dominating the classroom and the teacher's
attention, girls speak up, take leadership positions, and pursue nontradi-
tional studies. 57 "Girls who attend single-sex secondary schools are more
likely to choose science or mathematics .... [S]ubject choices in coedu-
cational schools [are] more affected by sex stereotypes than [are] choices in
single-sex schools." '158 Moreover, girls perform better in these subjects in
single-gender schools. 59
While there is no evidence that the advantages to girls attending all-
female schools instead of co-ed schools are due entirely to the absence of
males, it is logical to assume that there is some connection. It may be that
all-girls schools provide a haven from the bombardment of subtle messages
about women's proper place, and allow girls to develop some self-esteem
and a higher opimon of their gender. If "self-esteem is a precondition of
happiness, it is not unreasonable to value a temporary environment for
some young women wich might promote a more positive self-image at a
very vulnerable time, and which nght thereby better prepare them to face
competitive realities later."1 6° It may also be that all-girls schools "free
[their] students of the burden of playing the mating game while attending
classes .... ."61 Some studies have shown that girls will deliberately hold
back from achievement out of fear that boys will not find them attractive
153. "The hidden curriculum consists of messages about the status and character
of individuals and groups." KLEiN, supra note 143, at 282. "Gender differences in patterns
of achievement . are . the creation of the 'hidden curriculum' " Milman & de
Garna, supra note 144, at 6.
154. Milman & de Gama, supra note 144, at 22.
155. See Feldblum et al., supra note 105, at 174.
156. Rhode, supra note 47, at 141.
157. See, e.g., Dubnoff, supra note 80, at 324-25.
158. Id. at 326.
159. See, e.g., PETER MAcDoNAI r EAL., THE SoCIAL CoNTExTs OF ScHooUNo 188 (Mike
Cole ed., 1989).
160. Dubnoff, supra note 80, at 328.
161. Mississippi Umv. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 739 n.5 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Brief for Mississippi Umversity for Women Alumnae Association as amicus
curiae at 2-3, Hogan (No. 81-406)).
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if they are too successful. 162 In a single-gender setting, girls can demonstrate
their full abilities without fear of social rejection for being "too smart."
But whatever the reason for their success, it is clear that certain all-girls
learmng environments are much more likely to counteract the effects of
societal discrimination than are co-ed schools. Thus, a strong relationship
between all-girls schools and the promotion of equal opportunity exists.
All-girls schools which encourage students to overcome stereotypes are
substantially related to important and legitimate state interests. Whether
promoting equal opportunity generally, or redressing discrimination specif-
ically, single-gender schools for girls are constitutionally permissible. Indeed,
they are not only permissible, but necessary. "Eliminating [sex discrimna-
tion] will take time and effort ... In the meantime, all-female orgamza-
tions can be a critical tool in overcoming the harms [it] cause[s]."'
Many of the arguments in favor of all-girls schools nught also apply to
schools for another subordinated group: African-American boys. Schools
which help these boys overcome stereotypes and other obstacles which they
face because of their race would meet the intermediate level of scrutiny.
But racial discrimnation is subject to strict rather than intermediate scrutiny,
and it is unlikely that a court would find these schools "necessary to serve
a compelling government objective."' 4 Public education programs can avoid
this issue by opemng their doors to boys of all races.iss A problem still
remains, however. All-boys schools, even when designed to empower a
subordinated group like African-American males, exclude yet another sub-
ordinated group: African-American females. Afncan-Amencan women are
one of the most marginalized and disempowered groups in our society.
Before we conclude that minonty all-boys schools are substantially related
to important and legitimate goals, we must examine their effect on the
subordinated status of African-American girls.
In summary, all-female public schools which redress the effects of dis-
crimination or promote equal opportunity are constitutional, but all-female
programs which perpetuate stereotypical notions of the proper role of women
are not. All-male schools which attempt to redress the effects of racial
discrimination are unlikely to meet the strict scrutiny requred for race
cases. Nor are they likely to meet the intermediate scrutiny for gender
discrimination when the effects of the school on the excluded girls are
considered. All-male public education inevitably perpetuates gender mequi-
162. See, e.g., Dubnoff, supra note 80, at 327.
163. Feldblum et aL., supra note 105, at 214.
164. See supra text accompanying note 29.
165. In school districts like Detroit's, which is 90% African-American, see supra note 1,
schools can create minority programs without having to intentionally discnminate. For a
discussion of the race issue in urban all-male public programs, see Greenfeld, supra note 7.
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ties, and thus violates the constitutional guarantees of equal opportunity
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Applying Federal Statutes to Single-Gender Schools
Those all-girls schools which do pass constitutional muster must also
comply with any applicable statutes or regulations. At the federal level,'1
these schools must comply with the provisions of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972167 and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
19 74 ,168 as well as the regulations promulgated under each of them.169 So
long as the provisions are followed, these all-girls schools are statutorily,
as well as constitutionally, permissible.
Title IX declares that "no person ... shall be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
educational program ... receiving Federal [funds] . ".. ,170 Primary and
secondary schools are exempt from the requirements of Title IX in regard
to their admissions policies.' 7' Thus, single-gender elementary and secondary
schools can exclude members of the other gender without violating Title
IX.172 Regulations promulgated under Title IX reflect this exception for
primary and secondary schools' admissions policies. 73 However, the provi-
sions of Title IX extend beyond admissions, and it is only for admissions
that elementary and secondary schools are excepted. The regulations imple-
menting Title IX provide that students may not be given "different aid,
benefits, or services" because of their sex.'74
In reviewing the application of this section, the court in Garrett found
that Detroit's male academy violated Title IX because the school offered
subjects, special tutoring, and Saturday classes that were not available at
any one school which girls could attend. 175 Girls, therefore, did not have
166. This Note does not address the application of state laws.
167. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988).
168. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1721 (1988).
169. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act may also apply, but "[a]s far as single-sex elementary
and secondary schools are concerned [it] adds little, if anything, to Equal Educational
Opportunities Act of 1974." Elizabeth C. Yen, Single-Sex Schools and Sex Segregation Within
Schools: Constitutional and Statutory Remedies, 55 CONN. B. J. 387, 394 (1981).
170. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
171. Id; Yen, supra note 169, at 397.
172. Such an exclusion would be valid as long as the "local educational agency" provides
comparable facilities and resources to students of the other gender. 34 C.F.R. § 106.35 (1991).
173. Id. However, the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education has said that
all-male public elementary and secondary programs violate Title IX. Garrett v. Board of Educ.,
775 F Supp. 1004, 1009 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
174. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(2) (1991).
175. Garrett, 775 F Supp. at 1009 (rejecting the school's contention "that the educational
programs are no different from the individualized instruction and benefits offered in other
schools throughout the system").
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access to the same programs as the boys at the academy. The court's
analysis suggests that so long as members of the excluded gender have
access to equivalent programs and benefits at a school which they can
attend, the exclusion will not violate Title IX or its regulations. A consti-
tutionally permissible all-girls school is not likely to offer any benefit to its
students, other than the absence of boys, which boys cannot obtain at co-
ed schools.
All-girls schools are also subject to the Equal Educational Opportunities
Act (EEOA).176 The EEOA, though, "is an anomaly. [In it,] Congress finds
that maintenance of dual school systems in which students are assigned
solely on the basis of sex denies [to those students] equal protection" of
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" While students cannot
be assigned to schools by gender, the EEOA does not generally prohibit
segregation on the basis of gender. 78
Lower courts are divided in their interpretation of the statute. 79 The
court in Vorchheimer found that the EEOA did not prohibit single-gender
public schools, 80 while the court in United States v. Hinds County School
Board found that it did.' 8' Hinds County, however, involved an entire
school district segregated by gender. There the assignment of students solely
on the basis of gender clearly fell within the dictates of the EEOA. Does
the EEOA even apply when students are not assigned to a single-gender
school, but rather are given the choice between attending a co-ed school
and an all-girls school?
Looking at the plain language of the Act, it appears to prohibit only the
assignment of students to gender-segregated schools. Voluntary attendance
at a single-gender school would not violate the declared policy that "all
children enrolled in public schools are entitled to equal educational oppor-
tunity without regard to . . sex ' ' 82 so long as equivalent opportunities
were provided to all students.' Furthermore, segregation by gender is not
a denial of equal educational opportunity under the Act.184 When Congress
deliberately omitted gender segregation from its definition of denial of equal
opportunity and consistently used the word "assignment" to define prohib-
ited segregation, it effectively exempted voluntarily attended single-gender
176. See 20 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
177. Vorchhenmer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 703
(1977).
178. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a).
179. Dubnoff, supra note 80, at 308.
180. Vorchheimer, 532 F.2d at 885. But see Yen, supra note 169, at 392 (noting that
Vorchhenmer's discussion of EEOA should be considered dicta).
181. 560 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1977).
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(1).
183. See supra note 80.
184. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a).
[Vol. 68:149
SEPARATING THE SEXES
schools.8 So long as a school district provides all students access to
educational opportunities and benefits equivalent to those provided by a
single-gender school, the plan will comply with both the EEOA and Title
IX and its regulations. Thus an all-female public educational program which
promotes equal opportunity or compensates for the effects of gender dis-
crimination can be both constitutionally and statutorily permitted.
V. CONCLUSION
The only public educational programs that can be restricted to members
of one gender are those which (1) promote equal opportunity between the
genders and (2) do not offer services which are unattainable elsewhere. All-
male classes and schools such as those proposed in Detroit, Milwaukee,
Baltimore, and Brooklyn do not meet this standard. They offer special
tutoring and subjects for boys for which girls have no equivalent. Moreover,
rather than promoting equality between the genders, these schools serve to
perpetuate male dominance by creating in both boys and girls the perception
that boys are more valuable or more deserving of attention. Both genders
face appalling problems, but only the boys are receiving attention.
The focus on boys serves to reinforce the idea that girls take second place
in our society. Looking at the problems of urban youth, we are distressed
to find that boys are failing, dropping out, and being suspended and
expelled, only to end up murdered or in prison. We do not notice, or
perhaps we overlook, evidence that girls are also failing, dropping out,
getting pregnant, and being assaulted, harassed, and intimidated in school.
Girls end up as single-parent heads of households whose sons grow up to
be unemployed, imprisoned, or murdered. Perhaps to solve the problems
of the sons we ought first to look at preventing the problems of the mothers.
The idea behind all-male classes was to use public education as a means
of combatting social ills. Yet it is that same public education which underlies
many of the social ills confronting girls. Education must be reformed in a
way that does not exacerbate the effects of discrimination against girls;
indeed, it should be reformed to counteract these problems. Because co-ed
schools are essentially boys' schools, girls should be offered an alternative.
The goal in establishing all-girls programs should be to create a society in
which their compensatory function is no longer needed. Any educational
reform program should include both a plan for compensatory all-girls
programs and a plan to eliminate the inequities currently abounding in co-
185. But see Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775 F Supp. 1004, 1009 n.10 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
("Exempting freedom of choice plans would have destroyed the effectiveness of the EEOA
11).
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ed schools. Only after these goals have been accomplished can we have true
equality of opportunity.
